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ABSTRACT
Refusing White Privacy
by
Olivia Dunbar

Advisor: Rupal Oza
In “Refusing White Privacy” I look at theories in White Data and Surveillance Studies
around what data is, how it is made to exist, and for whom, in order to intervene in the
conceptualization of data as an inevitable residue of human life and relationship. Through this
intervention, I show that the alleged crises of privacy ushered in by allegedly non-racial smart
technologies (a preoccupation in WDSS) is underwritten by racializing technologies from the
Antebellum era to the present.
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A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
In this paper I use the term white Data and Surveillance Studies (WDSS) to name the
dominant strand of Data and Surveillance Studies in which race/gender/sexuality/ability/status/
and environment are taken as ‘other’ elements of the world, apart from data and surveillance, that
can be analyzed in relation to data and surveillance as intersecting areas of interest. In WDSS, race/
gender/sexuality/ability/status/environment are not seen as foundational to the logics of data and
surveillance that emerge in tandem with the modern world/bureaucratic state and market.1
To give a concrete, if not banal example that is characteristic of WDSS, here is an
endorsement that David Lyon, the Director of the Surveillance Studies Centre at Queen’s University
and a leading scholar in WDSS, wrote for the 2015 volume Feminist Surveillance Studies: “surveillance
cannot but be about social sorting, so it must also always be about inequalities. This book prods and
provokes its readers to focus critically on those inequalities so that the study of surveillance never
slips into complacency or complicity” (Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015). For contrast, Feminist
Surveillance Studies self-describes its contributors as using feminist theory “to expose the ways in
which surveillance practices and technologies are tied to systemic forms of discrimination that serve
to normalize whiteness, able-bodiedness, capitalism, and heterosexuality” (2015). In Lyon’s terms,
surveillance is about social sorting and inequality, and yet the study of surveillance can slip into
complacency or complicity if it does not focus on social sorting and inequality. What then would be
the focus of surveillance studies, if it did not focus on surveillance? In my terms, this logic of
Here I am referring to conceptions of ‘the modern world/bureaucratic state and market’ from
Black studies, specifically from the works of Paul Gilroy and Cedric Robinson, who theorize
modernity and the capitalism from transatlantic slavery through their concepts of the Black Atlantic
and racial capitalism respectively. In their concepts, Blackness as both real object and object of
knowledge is not marginal to modernity and the market, rather it is central to and enmeshed with
modernity and the market.
1

In WDSS and other fields deploying white ‘universalist’ conceptions of the world, ‘the modern
world/bureaucratic state and market’ is theorized as a central social, political and economic break in
history that in non-racial, occurring alongside ‘developments’ in race and ethnicity that are marginal
to it.
!1

separating the study of something form the thing itself is part of the practice of WDSS, wherein
relation and sociality are expressed as objects of study and part of a white temporal logic of
temporariness, as in white people feeling “temporarily bad about black suffering” (Rankin, 2015). In
WDSS Blackness and anti-Blackness can be studied temporarily, but never orient the study of white
data and surveillance towards the abolition of an anti-Black world.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper I place Blackness and anti-Blackness at the foundations of the modern world/
bureaucratic state and market. I look at theories in WDSS around what data is, how it is made to
exist, and for whom, in order to intervene in the conceptualization of data as an inevitable residue
of human life and relationship. Through this intervention, I show that the alleged crises of privacy
ushered in by allegedly non-racial smart technologies (a preoccupation in WDSS) is underwritten by
racializing technologies from the Antebellum era to the present. By looking as far back as the
Antebellum era, I connect racializing technologies during slavery to racializing smart technologies
today, and demonstrate that white privacy requires the destruction of Black sociality through the
racialization, capture and representation of Blackness as criminality and property.
In section one, “Data as Capture,” I intervene in the popular idea in WDSS that data –
meaning ‘a thing given’ – would be better known as capta, or ‘a thing taken.’ I discuss how this
inversion or antonym maintains the premise that data exists whether it is made to or not. I challenge
this premise by following the etymological method that scholars in WDSS have used to arrive at
capta, and come myself instead to the word captive. Beyond of the binary of give and take that
WDSS establishes, my use of the word captive grounds data and surveillance in racial hierarchies.
Centering the captive, I examine the relationship between racism – “the state-sanctioned or
extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature
death” (Gilmore, 247) – and machine learning to demonstrate how white theories of ‘artificial
intelligence’ maintain and protect privacy as property ownership. I analyze data in the context of the
algorithmic analysis it makes possible to reflect on networked carceral technologies and predictive
policing as technologies that code carceral space.
In section two, “Code/space,” I perform a counter-reading of the term code/space, a
keyword and theory in WDSS introduced by geographers Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge. Kitchin
and Dodge discuss private or home space prior to computer code as a space of sanctuary,
!3

possession and security. In contrast, code/space breaches the privacy of home space and private
property ownership through the intrusion of the market into the domestic sphere. This intrusion
breaks the barrier between public spaces of production, and private spaces of reproduction. Code/
space as theorized by Kitchin and Dodge assumes that the user or inhabitant of code/space as selfpossessing and free, that code/space does not impact the physical body or flesh of the human user
or inhabitant. To counter this conception of code/space and privacy that does not address the body,
I analyze technologies of e-carceration including ‘risk assessment’ software, ankle monitors, and
house arrest apps that are transforming home spaces through code in predominantly Black and
Brown communities. Through code/spaces of e-carceration, I draw an expanded time-line of
WDSS that traces code, data and surveillance to the Antebellum era and racial slavery. I connect
capture and e-carceration to the coding of the Black body as property, specifically in the capture of
the reproductive systems and interiority of enslaved women of African descent. In my reading of
carceral space across time, I aim to connect private spaces of white sociality and sovereignty to the
practices of anti-Black capture that define carceral space.
In the last section, “The Mobilization of White Privacy,” I follow the time-space named by
“plantation futures” (McKittrick, 2013) to relate digital computing and white privacy to an older
technology, analogue photography, that created and secured code/space and generated criminal
databases long before the advent of digital computer code and algorithms. I look at a specific
moment in American history at the end of the 19th century when the technology of analogue
photography was becoming mobile and increasingly ubiquitous in urban areas. As studio
photography ceased to be the dominant site of photographic capture, and street or candid
photography began its takeover, propertied whites questioned how to address the threat posed by
nonconsensual photographic representation to their own privacy and experience of self-possession.
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DATA AS CAPTURE
To enter the question of what data is, how it is made to exist, and for whom, I take up a
frequently cited etymological intervention from WDSS. In this intervention, WDSS scholar Rob
Kitchin explores the etymology of the word data. Kitchin notes that data is a Latin word that means
“a fact given,” from the Latin verb dare, meaning “to give” (2014, 2). Citing sociologist Howard
Becker, Kitchin suggests that data is a misnomer and that capta, from the Latin verb capere meaning
“to take, seize,” would more accurately describe what “we” refer to when “we” say data (2). This
gesture is part of a movement in WDSS to critically interrogate the notion that data is freely given.
Through capta, scholars in WDSS consider that individuals own or possess their own data before it is
taken by either private or public institutions, usually without compensation other than the alleged
improvement of services for the individual as consumer/user/citizen. While purporting to
recognize that data is taken, WDSS scholars continue to treat data as given: something that exists
‘naturally’ in and of the world, that can be taken with or without consent.
In his discussion of etymology and the word data, Kitchin cites a passage by Jensen, quoted
in Becker (1952), to establish a scholarly precedent for thinking capta:
It is an unfortunate accident of history that the term datum…rather than captum…
should have come to symbolize the unit-phenomenon in science. For science deals,
not with ‘that which has been given’ by nature to the scientist, but with ‘that which
has been taken’ or selected from nature by the scientist in accordance with his
purpose, and to a degree even constructed out of nature by the scientist’s
preliminary assumptions as to which of “the things which have been given” are also
to be “taken” or observed.
The excerpt up to word “purpose” has been widely circulated since Kitchin’s 2014 book The Data
Revolution. However, when I focus on the remainder of the except, I see an emphasis on the
relationship between the scientist’s conception of self as observer/taker, and the scientist’s
perception of ‘everything else’ as observable/given. This relationship conceives of a subject whose
faculties of perception turn others into objects whose being is for the subject. Following this logic,
data is like air, it is always around, but is encountered by the breather only when they breathe,
!5

although their act of breathing is inevitable and involuntary, or given. As if the scientist cannot help
but take that which they observe. Following Kitchin’s venture into etymology, I want to see what
other meanings can be derived from capere in relation to data and surveillance to destabilize the
binary of give and take.
Alongside its meaning “to take, seize,” capere is also the root of the word Perceive. Perceive
comes from the Latin verb percipere, meaning to seize and understand, from per (entirely) + capere (to
take, seize). Read in relation to “to take, seize,” perception is not a neutral onto-biological
phenomenon the occurs in the space of exchange between observer and observed. Rather as a
biosocial affect, it is grounded in sociogeny, Frantz Fanon’s term that intervenes in Freudian
psychoanalysis that attributes the development of both the individual subject (the human) and the
collective group (family, tribe, race) to ontogenetic inheritance and biological or evolutionary
disposition (2008). With sociogeny, Fanon proposes that both the individual subject and collective
group are socially produced modes of being human that co-constitute an anti-Black world and
exclude Blackness from the category of the human. The experience of what it is like to be human
(defined through its exclusion of Blackness) is therefore mediated by anti-Blackness. Within the
framework of sociogeny, perception is a socialized process mediated by anti-Blackness, not a neutral
biological phenomenon. In an anti-Black world, the perception of other social phenomena – like
crime, data, or capture – are attributed to that which is ‘given’ ontogenetically in ‘nature’ and
‘biology,’ like culture, language or geography (Blackness). How to move beyond the binary of give
and take? Refuse anti-Blackness.
In addition to capta and perceive, capere is also the root of the words captive and captivity. In
Kitchin’s effort to acknowledge the power dynamics at play in data, he shifts from thinking of data
as a thing given to a thing taken, and presumes that those from which things are taken are human,
self-possessing, free subjects or communities. In shifting from give to take, it is not the ruse of
benevolence that is exposed, but rather the ruse of whiteness. From within the framework of
!6

sociogeny, however, the opposite of give is not take, it is refuse – the refusal of anti-Blackness, of
capture and property. In WDSS, privacy is given as a primary mode of refusing the extraction of
data (performed by state and corporate institutions). In this context, refusal is predicated on the selfpossession of propertied whites. How does the captive and their refusal of captivity challenge
theories of privacy in WDSS? To answer this question, I begin with an analysis of the increasing use
of digital computing and algoirthms in predictive policing. In my analysis, I relate the notion of
precedent to prediction to demonstrate how privacy for propertied whites in underwritten by the
criminalization and capture of Blackness.
A wide range of institutions use algorithms as part of their day-to-day operations. Many big
tech corporations, like Alphabet and Amazon, design their own algorithms in-house as an integrated
component of their platforms, while the majority of state or ‘public’ institutions, like police
departments, school districts and child protective services, purchase software from private-sector
companies who specialize in algorithm design (Pangburn, 2019). Both big tech corporations and
‘public’ institutions make data exist through the surveillance of user engagement with their
platforms.2 Big tech corporations use algorithms to make all kinds of decisions, from what search
results will appear first, to what images will be censored, to what speech will be considered hateful
(Noble 2018). ‘Public’ institutions use algorithms to make all kinds of decisions too, from what
neighborhoods will be policed, to which teachers will be fired, to which mothers will receive child
care vouchers (O’Neill, 2016). Whether online or ‘in real life’ (IRL), algorithms are replacing human
beings as decision makers. However, human beings are the programmers of algorithms, and they are
also the creators of the data sets that are used in algorithm design. In this sense, although ‘artificially

In this paper I consider the binary between public and private used in WDSS and other settler
colonial studies as a naturalized function of whiteness. Within whiteness, public is used to denote
property that is not owned by an individual, but rather by the state. This formulation of public is
underwritten by technologies of settler colonialism and transatlantic slavery that continue to
generate white notions of property, privacy and publicness through the death, capture and enclosure
of Black and Indigenous peoples.
2
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intelligent,’ algorithms do not function independently of the biases that inform their design and
implementation. Artificial intelligence produces predictions about the future based on judgements
about the past. The intelligence is only ‘artificial’ insofar as it is a machine doing the data analysis
and calculating the meaning, categorization or judgement, rather than a human. While closely
associated with computers and digital technologies, an algorithm is simply a process or set of rules
to be followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations (OED, “Algorithm”). Laws are
also algorithms, and while non-digital, they are also based on precedent, using existing judgements
or rulings to determine how current cases will be decided. Whatever bias is present in ‘naturally
intelligent’ decision making and policy will translate to artificially intelligent decision making and
policy. The term artificial refers more to the quantity and speed that a computer program can
process data than to any transformation in the logic or structure of the analysis or outcome that an
algorithm can generate.
Algorithms are written through their programmer’s coding of existing data sets, such as
profile pictures, arrest records, geographic locations and credit histories. Algorithms do not generate
new meanings, rather they code data to assign pre-determined meanings to new sets of information.
Through the assignment of these pre-determined meanings, algorithms produce conclusions about
the meaning of the data sets, without any input from the people from whom the data has been made
to exist as data. In the criminal justice system, the integration of smart technology and aolgorithms
with ‘crime prevention’ is known as predictive policing. Many police departments across the United
States now use ‘risk assessment’ software to determine the locations and times of day that require an
increased police presence. These areas, known as ‘hot spots,’ are visualized through digital mapping
using different intensities of hot and cold colors to denote greater and lesser areas of ‘risk.’ The
primary data sets used to design these risk assessment algorithms are arrest records. These records
are impacted by factors including ‘racial bias,’ or racism that motivates the over-policing and overincarceration of racialized communities. Therefore, arrest records will indicate that the risk of
!8

criminal activity increases in Black and Brown neighborhoods, especially poor Black and Brown
neighborhoods, and will dispatch police officers in greater numbers to those areas (Data 4 Black
Lives; Angwin, Larson, Mattu and Kirchner, 2016). As data sets used to create predictive policing
software, arrest records are transformed from archives of racist policing into ‘unbiased information’
used to streamline and sanitize problems including racial profiling. As archives of anti-Blackness,
arrest records are made to exist by the state and its police officers who determine that people are
breaking the law – an anti-Black world makes human behavior and sociality (Blackness) into criminal
activity that is recorded and collected as data.
Predictive policing is frequently cited as an improvement or upgrade to non-algorithmic
policing that involves ‘human error’ (Ferguson, 2017). Many counties across the United States use
risk assessment software to mitigate deteriorating community relations in the context of the
increased visibility of police brutality in the era of social media. One year after Ferguson Police
officer Darren Wilson murdered 18 year-old Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, the St. Louis
County police department introduced the predictive policing software HunchLab to its operations.
HunchLab was implemented in response to the protests following Brown’s murder and the negative
optics that these uprisings created for the police department. The HunchLab website describes the
software as “next generation predictive policing” (HunchLab). The word generation refers to the
‘upgrade’ made to carceral technology that claims to streamline human experience through the
sanitization of ‘human error’ in the context of the criminal justice system. While the word
generation refers to the evolution of smart technologies, ‘generation’ also evokes the transgenerational, centuries-long coding of Blackness as criminal in propertied white societies –
racializing surveillance and the coding of human life (Blackness) is not a phenomenon that emerged
in tandem with digital computing. Rather than address bias and racial profiling in Ferguson, the St.
Louis County police department downplayed the crisis as a problem of ‘human error’ (Chammah,
2016). Eliminate human error with HunchLab, and they would eliminate the problem of police
!9

brutality. In a comment on the mechanization of policing in Ferguson, Black studies scholars Fred
Moten and Stefano Harney identify Darren Wilson as a “Drone” that was “instrumentalized” to
enact genocide in the state’s defense (2017, 19). As the term drone most often refers to an
unmanned aerial vehicle capable of remote sense through remote human control, Moten and
Harney’s use of the term enacts a counter-reading of the idea of the instrument in relation to antiBlackness and policing. In a conversation with Robin Kelley, Moten elaborates on this idea:
We need to understand what it actually is that the state is defending itself from and I
think that in this respect, the particular instances of Michael Brown’s murder and
Eric Garner’s murder are worth paying some attention to because what the drone,
Darren Wilson, shot into that day was insurgent Black life walking down the street. I
don’t think he meant to violate the individual personhood of Michael Brown, he was
shooting at mobile Black sociality walking down the street in a way that he
understood implicitly constituted a threat to the order he represents and that he is
sworn to protect (cited in Wang 2018, 192).
While both Wilson and Brown appeared in public space, the algorithm of anti-Blackness coded
Brown as a ‘body’ or property of the state and therefore public and violable – Wilson’s status as
‘human,’ self-possessing and private or sovereign is made possible through the arrest, capture and
destruction of mobile Black sociality. Or as Black studies and STS scholar Ruha Benjamin writes,
“vampirically, white vitality feeds on black demise – from the extraction of (re)productive slave labor
to build the nation’s wealth to the ongoing erection of prison complexes to resuscitate rural
economies – in these ways and many more, white life and black death are inextricable” (41). White
vitality, including natality, is an anti-social enterprise that instrumentalizes Black death to propel
theories of self-possession and ontogenetic inheritance. In WDSS, privacy is conceived of as a
corporeal right that extends outwards from the human body. What privacy extends outwards from
risk? As the long present of anti-Black violence and police brutality demonstrates, risk assessment
technologies pre-date digital computing. Physical, social and intimate geographies are coded as risky
according to racializing algorithms3 that pre-date digital computing. In a propertied white world,
A process or set of rules to be followed in calculations or other problem-solving operations (OED,
“Algorithm”).
3
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Black life is high risk because it threatens whiteness as vitality. White vitality – defined as selfpossession and corporeal privacy from the market – is insured by Black death that fortifies the
market. WDSS takes up white vitality as its central organizing principle without naming it as such.
Through this principle, technology is thought as discursive matter, and Black death is overlooked as
not mattering at all. WDSS studies technology as a tool that has the potential to threaten white
privacy, while productively indexing Blackness for destruction to sustain and expand the market.
In the next section, “Code/space,” I discuss how the idea of ‘code’ or digital computing is
deployed in WDSS to fight for the fortification of propertied whiteness through privacy. I relate this
fight for privacy and the separation of reproductive and productive labor that it entails to a different
kind of code/space produced through technologies of e-carceration. Through my examination of
technologies of e-carceration, I arrive at the algorithmic racialization of space prior to software and
digital computing. I analyze how spaces of home and the market were coded in the Antebellum era
according to racist laws defining freedom and capture through Black women’s reproductive labor.

!11

CODE/SPACE
In their 2011 book Code/Space: Software and Everyday Life, WDSS scholars and geographers
Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge introduce the term “code/space” to name physical spaces that are
newly networked through computer code. The authors analyze examples of code/space including
airports, offices, cafes and homes, whose pre-digital functions are reengineered by smart technology
and wireless internet. Kitchin and Dodge give examples of code/spaces of home where parents can
now play with their children, cook dinner, check work emails and make purchases all in the same
physical space of their home (2011, 174). The intrusion of the market into the home through work
emails, texts, Amazon and the internet of things (including coffee makers, thermostats, and motor
vehicle GPS systems) provides increased comfort and convenience while simultaneously
encroaching on users’ privacy and sense of sanctuary. The authors describe home space prior to
code/space as a place for “personal life and privacy from others; a place with layers of memories
and meanings from the past; a sanctuary that offers security and safety from the wider world” (159).
Through computer programming and software, code/space redraws the boundaries between
productive and reproductive labor that characterize the pre-digital distinction between public and
private or home life for propertied whites. Where the home and the market were once separate,
smart technology allows the market into the domestic sphere.
To demonstrate this conflict between the increased comfort and convenience that smart
technology provides and the threat it poses to privacy and sanctuary, the Kitchin and Dodge
perform audits of three “typical (Western) homes” (160). In these homes, a variety of objects are
embedded with software and are “reconfiguring the social and material relations of home, often in
banal and subtle ways” (161). From climate and light control to digital television recording, smart
technologies allow elements in each home to function according to the preferences of their users/
consumers/inhabitants, while also collecting information about the habits and purchases of their
users/consumers/inhabitants. In exchange for the services provided by the technology, the
!12

technology cuts into the users’ privacy by sharing their data (produced through the surveillance of
their use/consumption) with the technology’s designers/manufacturers. Through user data, big tech
corporations develop ‘identities’ for who their users are and and shape who they are likely to be in
the future. Ironically, Kitchin and Dodge do not give any identity markers for the inhabitants of the
three homes in their audit, aside from age, employment and home ownership status. The authors go
into great detail to describe the relationship between code and the internet of things (including
coffee makers, thermostats, and motor vehicle GPS systems), but they omit any discussion of code/
space technologies that mark people (bodies and flesh), including race/gender/sexuality/ability/
status/environment. As an afterthought to the consumer objects in each home, Kitchin and Dodge
note an RFID tag that is implanted under the skin of one family’s dog and “render[s] [her] machine
readable” (161) to provide details such as her home address and current location in case she ever
gets lost. This is the closest any of the family members come to biopolitical surveillance, or
electronic monitoring that is embedded in their physical body. The humans in these “typical
(Western) homes” are never “rendered machine readable” (161) through mandated electronic
tagging. While Kitchin and Dodge are concerned that user privacy is undermined in code/space,
they are not concerned with how code/space compromises users who are used by both state and
private institutions to code space as criminal, as in the case of anti-Blackness and predictive policing.
In the authors’ conception of code/space, neither codes nor spaces are theorized as
producers of racial hierarchies. In my consideration of the relationship between racial hierarchies
and code/space through the position of the captive, I examine the coding of people’s bodies
through software-driven carceral technologies known collectively as as e-carceration. E-carceration is
gradually replacing analogue technologies of the prison industrial complex including cash bail.
Where cash bail is eliminated in states like California and New Jersey, ‘risk assessment’ software is
used instead by prosecutors and judges to determine whether or not a person who has been arrested
and is awaiting a trial or plea deal should be released or held in jail. Risk assessment algorithms turns
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Black peoples’ bodies and other Black intimate geographies into code/space. These patented
software products are sold to state institutions by the private corporations that design them. There is
no transparency around the data sets that are used to design the algorithms, or the conclusions that
the software is programmed to draw when fresh data sets are analyzed (Wang, 2018; Horning, 2012).
This collision of privacy, code and space at the level of the human body is part of a larger project
of color-blind racism and white supremacy4 that fuels the shifting prison industrial complex towards
e-carceration or “The Newest Jim Crow” (Alexander, 2010; 2018). In addition to risk assessment
software that determines the terms of bail, those individuals who have already served time in prison
are are increasingly released on parole with electronic tags known as ankle monitors.
Ankle monitors are programmed with GPS tracking to share the ‘user’s’ location with police
at all times. Through this tracking, the monitor notifies law enforcement if the geographic
boundaries of the ‘user’s’ parole are violated. As many people released on parole are under house
arrest, ankle monitors create code/spaces of e-carceration where people formerly incarcerated in
prisons and jails are now bound to their homes, or to their immediate neighborhoods in certain
cases, making it impossible to travel for employment, to visit family or to participate in other types
of community. In addition to these movement restrictions, people fitted with electronic tags are
required to pay up to 35$ a day ($1050 a month) to rent the device (Solon, 2018). For a person
released on bail and awaiting trial, this cost creates an additional pressure to accept a plea deal in
order to be free from mounting debt (Kilgore, 2018). Alongside the barriers imposed by software,
the limitations of hardware including length of charge and battery depletion further restrict the
‘user’s’ movements, as a dead battery will alert the police that the ‘user’ has lost service, which is
considered a parole violation that can result in arrest and return to prison. In addition to hardware/
ankle monitors, private companies are experimenting with software in the form of smartphone apps

Dylan Rodriguez defines white supremacy as “a logic of social organization that produces
regimented, institutionalized, and militarized conceptions of hierarchized ‘human difference’” (11).
4
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that interface with “tamper proof ” wrist worn monitoring devices networked together through
Bluetooth (Gable, 2017). The Arkansas-based company E-Cell makes an app to “unlock the future
of house arrest monitoring” through GPS tracking, dynamic remote check-ins and biometric
identification called the House Arrest App (House Arrest App). In a promotional video uploaded by
E-Cell in 2016, an in-screen video of the House Arrest Dashboard (the interface used by the
institution or organization doing the monitoring) shows profile photos of “clients” spread across a
map, each with a colored outline to indicate their level of “compliance” with the terms of their
arrest (HouseArrestApp.com). House arrest monitoring apps utilize the same technologies found in
non-carceral consumer apps such as location sharing and finger print analysis, however the status of
the user is uniquely marked as unfree and they have no option to opt-out and halt service.
In contrast to the smart devices analyzed in ‘typical (Western) homes,’ technologies of ecarceration produce ‘home’ as a code/space of racializing surveillance in the afterlife of slavery.
Saidiya Hartman, Professor of African American literature and Women’s and Gender Studies at
Columbia University, introduces the afterlife of slavery in her 2006 book Lose Your Mother: A Journey
Along the Transatlantic Slave Route:
“If slavery persists as an issue in the political life of black America, it is not because
of an antiquarian obsession with bygone days or the burden of a too-long memory,
but because black lives are still imperiled and devalued by a racial calculus and a
political arithmetic that were entrenched centuries ago. This is the afterlife of
slavery--skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death,
incarceration, and impoverishment” (2007, 6).
In the afterlife of slavery, both state and private actors have introduced software to calculate the
“skewed life chances, limited access to health and education, premature death, incarceration, and
impoverishment” that persist for Black people in America. In the afterlife of slavery, privacy is not
given, nor is it taken, rather it is captured through anti-Black racism and violence. Recall that Kitchin
and Dodge describe home as a space that provides “personal life and privacy from others; a place
with layers of memories and meanings from the past; a sanctuary that offers security and safety
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from the wider world” (159). They theorize code/space as untouched by racial hierarchies, when in
fact racial hierarchies produce the conception of code/space as non-racial. To expand on how racial
hierarchies produces code/space, as non-racial, I turn to the algorithmic racialization of space prior
to software and digital computing to analyze how spaces of home and the market were coded in the
Antebellum era according to racist laws defining freedom and capture through Black women’s
reproductive labor.
As Hartman writes, “the line of division between the market and the household which
distinguished the public and the domestic and divided productive and reproductive labor for
propertied whites does not hold when describing the enslaved and the carceral landscape of
plantation” (2016, 168). Propertied whites maintained the distinction between private and public
space through the unfreedom of enslaved people of African descent and whose labors, both
productive and reproductive, were captured to drive the market. In the context of the antebellum
era and racial slavery, code/space might have referred to the reproductive systems of enslaved
women of African descent. The law that the free or slave status of the child followed the status of
the mother – partus sequitur ventrem – maintained racial hierarchies and the plantation economy by
coding the children of enslaved women of African descent. According to the white settler colonial
state, enslaved people of African descent were born into debt by virtue of being coded as property.
Under certain agreements with propertied white slave-owning individuals, they could buy their
freedom, thus paying off their debt, in order to be recognized by the state as free. In this sense,
according to the state, enslaved people of African descent were born into the market as property,
and thus had no privacy from the market that was underwritten by their capture.
Jennifer Morgan, Professor of History in the department of Social and Cultural Analysis at
New York University, analyzes the relationship between slavery, reproductive labor, the market,
property and privacy in the British colonies that would later become the independent United States:
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Freedom from the market—obviously an aspirational freedom for myriad unfree
white laborers—would ultimately become a defining mark of the intimate geography
of public and private space; but it was only conferred on those deemed to have a
legitimate claim. For women of African descent, both enslaved and free, the looming
danger of the market would immediately encroach on their pregnancies and the
births of their infants. The reach of the market breached their corporeal boundaries
in ways neither subtle nor incremental. And thus exposure to the market became as
intimate as the feelings of affection and as interior as a quickening pregnancy (13).
in the settler colonies, women of African descent experienced the market at the level of biopolitical
surveillance. Their flesh was coded as public insofar as the market captured their most intimate
experiences through racial slavery. This saturation of the market with human flesh upturns Kitchin
and Dodge’s conception of private and public space that gives rise to code/space in the digital age.
While Antebellum laws no longer code people and space, the plantation economy they guaranteed is
present in what Geographer and Black Studies scholar Katherine McKittrick calls “plantation
futures.” In the last section, “The Mobilization of White Privacy,” I follow the time-space named by
plantation futures to switch gears and relate digital computing and white privacy to an older
technology, analogue photography, that created and secured code/space and generated criminal
databases long before the advent of digital computer code and algorithms.
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THE MOBILIZATION OF WHITE PRIVACY
McKittrick defines “plantation futures” as “a conceptualization of time-space that tracks the
plantation toward the prison and the impoverished and destroyed city sectors and, consequently,
brings into sharp focus the ways the plantation is an ongoing locus of anti-black violence and death”
(McKittrick, 2013, 2-3). McKittrick cites George L. Beckford’s “plantation economy thesis” where
Beckford analyzes how the transatlantic slave trade “instituted a racialized economy that lingered
long after emancipation and independence movements in the Americas; and that the protracted
colonial logic of the plantation came to define many aspects of postslave life” (cited in Mckittrick,
2013, 3). In this section I examine an analogue technology – mobile analogue photography – that
emerged as a colonial logic of capture after the period of Reconstruction in America, and that
became widely used during Jim Crow. Through mobile analogue photography, the colonial logic of
the plantation came to define legal frameworks related to privacy through notions of ‘corporeal’ and
‘incorporeal’ rights.
After the Civil War and Reconstruction, propertied white society re-defined private and
public space through the rise of mobile media technologies including analogue photography. Where
propertied whites used analogue photography to code whiteness with individual identity, citizenship
and a right to the self, they also used it to code Blackness as criminal and hyper-sexual through
surveillance in the form of police records, social scientific studies and popular culture. In the hands
of propertied whites, analogue photography reinforced the inherent violability and publicness of
Blackness. At the same time, the making-mobile of analogue photography in the late 19th century
introduced problems for propertied whites who were used to sensing themselves as rights-bearing
and self-possessing subjects. As changes in technology allowed photographers to move out of the
studio and into the street, professional photographers captured pictures of propertied whites
without their consent. In fact, the idea of having to consent to having one’s photograph taken did
not yet exist until mobile analogue photography and “The Right to Privacy” began to circulate.
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In 1890, attorneys Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published “The Right to Privacy” in
the Harvard Law Review. The article was written in response to the mobilization of analogue
photography and its encroachments into the public sphere. Warren and Brandeis argued for the
regulation of representation and the right to privacy from media and recording in public space for
propertied whites. Their arguments unfolded from the declaration that “the term ‘property’ has
grown to comprise every form of possession – tangible as well as intangible” (193). Through
changing technologies, propertied whites were dispossessed of their intangible properties – their
ability to self-represent and their entitlement or ownership over such self-representations. In
response to this dispossession, Warren and Brandeis sought to “protect the privacy of the individual
from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other
modern device for recording or reproducing scenes or sounds” (206). It may seem hard to imagine a
time when photography was a specialized enterprise, rather than a function embedded in every
smartphone, but in the late 19th century there were no laws to govern the use of photography in
relation to consent and privacy.
Warren and Brandeis argue that recording technologies interrupt the sanctity of private life
through their prediction that “what is whispered in the closet halls shall be proclaimed from the
house-tops” (195). They advocated for changes in the legal conception of property, arguing that
from “corporeal property” – possession or ownership of one’s body – rises “incorporeal property”
– possessions arising from corporeal property, such as whispers, thoughts, feelings, and expressions
– effectively broadening the legal boundaries of whiteness to include those biosocial phenomena
that can be recorded through representational media technologies (193). In sum, “The Right to
Privacy” argued that “the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his shall be given to
the public” (199). Through the right to privacy, boundaries of individual white privacy extended into
the public sphere in the terms of the “incorporeal property” of any self-possessing individual.
Analogue photography reengineered the boundaries between private and public space to create
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further immunities and protections for white people at the expense of Black life, in much the same
way that computer code transforms the boundaries between private and public space today.
Analogue photography may seem distant from artificial intelligence and computer code, but
as an emerging mobile technology in the 19th century, it introduced portable and ‘artificial,’ or
mediated, perception that replicated ‘natural’ vision. Outside of the calls for incorporeal property
for propertied whites, this re-definition, in tandem with emancipation and Jim Crow, lead to the use
of photography to capture Blackness as a permanent condition of dispossession. Anti-Black terror
was captured in consumer photographic prints and postcards, while Black urban life was
criminalized and studied by sociologists and police who used photography to code blackness as
wayward and destitute (Hartman, 2019). Written in 1890, twenty-five years after the Black Codes and
over ten years into the Jim Crow era, “The Right to Privacy” was published alongside lynch laws and
vagrancy laws that enacted violence and capture in efforts to determine where, when and how newly
free Black people could live. These racist laws were written at the same time that convict
photography was introduced as a technology to build criminal databases in newly formed police
departments in US cities such as Chicago and New York City (Pareneti, 2003). “The Right to
Privacy” is an important document in WDSS because it grounds contemporary digital technologies
(and thus the study of study of data and surveillance absent of anti-Blackness) in a history of racist
divisions between the right to privacy and self-possession, and exposure to the market through the
dispossession on the body as object of property. Mobile analogue photography introduced a crisis
of privacy for propertied whites that resulted in whiteness being re-defined and expanded to include
the self-fashioning of ‘incorporeal property.’ At the same time, and with the same technology,
propertied whites represented Blackness as wayward, uncivilized, and criminal. Photography became
a new means to continue to code physical, social and intimate spaces as anti-Black, with certain
white aesthetic markers indicating an overflow of publicness, or lack of privacy, in Black
neighborhoods and communities to signal Black criminality as a threat to propertied white sociality.
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Through photography outside the bounds of the studio, scientists, social scientists, cultural
producers and police all made data exist from the ‘incorporeal properties’ of Black people, whose
expressions, thoughts and feelings were captured as objects of property through various analogue
algorithmic calculations in the afterlife of slavery. In these databases of the white gaze turned to
Black life and death, the mass of propertied whites saw poverty, criminality, destitution,
lasciviousness, and animality. What these databases capture is white privacy projected as risk and
debt upon the dispossessed, so that whiteness may retain its absolute incorporeal value.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper I have analyzed white conceptions of data and surveillance to demonstrate how
privacy persists in WDSS as a means to resist the intrusion of the market into the private lives of
propertied whites, at the expense of Black life and its enduring capture and exposure to the market
in and as death. At the beginning of my argument I resolved that the binary of give and take that
defines data in WDSS would be better understood as captivity and its refusal. I analyzed
technologies of e-carceration in relation to the theory of code/space to show how white
conceptions of privacy erase the reality of biopolitical tracking and surveillance of racialized
individuals and communities. I pointed to an example from scholars Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge
of a “typical (Western)” family dog outfitted with an RFID remote tracking device as the sole
instance in the theory of code/space where biopolitical surveillance is mentioned as a form of
code/space, coding the space of the body or flesh for capture. Then I demonstrated that code/
space, when considered in relation to e-carceration, must be read a theory that upholds the
destruction of insurgent Black sociality, as it describes changes to technology and environment that
erase the violent apprehension of corporeality in Black communities. I chose to follow my
discussion of code/space and e-carceration with a reading of “The Right to Privacy” and analogue
photography to demonstrate that digital technology does not break with previous regimes of white
privacy from the market. Through my analysis of privacy in the 19th century in relation to mediation
and perception, I connected the extension of white rights in the face of new technology to
plantation futures where white privacy is maintained and upheld through ever changing technologies
of anti-Blackness. In my reading of capture across different technologies, I placed WDSS and its
preoccupations in the afterlife of slavery as an anti-Black discourse underwritten by capture. In
WDSS, self-possession is an assumed right of the subject that is never questioned, and the
racializing effects of code remain unseen, despite WDSS’ alleged focus on making the unseen of
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data and surveillance visible. Through my case study of WDSS and computer code, I bring the
refusal of white privacy to bear on studies of data, surveillance and abolition.
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